


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MMF

20 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Interagency Memorandum: Turkey After the US
Arms Cutoff

1. This is the final draft of the interagency memorandum on Turkey. It incorporates the useful suggestions that [redacted] cabled yesterday [redacted] as well as some additional thoughts from DIA, INR, and CIA.

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2. We plan to place at Annex IC Staff's inventory of [redacted] [redacted] together with a map to show where the facilities are. The Annex is still Top Secret Umbra but I understand from General Wilson that his people are addressing the problem of how it might be adjusted to permit wider use later.

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3. The memorandum could be published as early as this evening or tomorrow. Please let me know if you have any special thoughts on dissemination. If you wish, I shall draft a bucksip for you to sign for Dr. Kissinger's copy.

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Acting National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

cc: DDCI
D/DCI/NIO
ER ✓
NIO/RI
NIO/WE

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February 20, 1975

INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM

Turkey After the US Arms Cutoff

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20 February 1975

INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM

Subject: Turkey After the US Arms Cutoff*

NOTE

It is too early to predict with much confidence precisely how Turkey will behave in reaction to the cutoff of US military aid. Indeed, it seems clear that the Turks themselves are just beginning to address the problem, largely because -- until now -- the prospect of such a cutoff has been for them something unthinkable.

As Turkey searches for a way out of the dilemma, however, we can identify some of the factors that will weigh heavily in Turkish calculations. These factors may provide useful clues with respect to the options open to Ankara and to how these impinge on US interests. The degree of Turkish dependence on US arms aid, the likely outcome of the inevitable search for alternate sources of military equipment, and the durability of Turkey's present orientation toward the West are some of the issues addressed in what follows.

For purposes of this paper, an indefinite cutoff of US military assistance is assumed. We try to look at least several months into the future.

* This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the Acting National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. It was drafted by CIA and DIA and has been reviewed and endorsed by representatives of State/INR as well as CIA and DIA.

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PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS

The Turks have no satisfactory alternative to US supply of arms, at least over the near term. Hence, the effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces and their ability to perform their key role in NATO will steadily deteriorate. The strategic implications of a protracted US cutoff could be profound, particularly in view of Turkey's strategic position anchoring NATO's southern flank and controlling Soviet access to the Mediterranean.

Although the Turks are shocked and appalled at the termination of US arms aid, their reaction thus far has been measured and they will probably avoid any rash response. If the arms cutoff continues, it is highly likely that the Turks will retaliate against the US in stages, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] This could seriously weaken the ability of US forces to operate in the area and jeopardize key intelligence collection programs.

Turkey's ties with NATO will also be damaged, but probably not as seriously as Turkish relations with the US. For at least the short term, much will depend on whether Turkey is successful in obtaining military equipment from other NATO countries to

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help compensate for the loss of US supply. If those countries are able to help Ankara in this way, moderate forces in Turkey will be strengthened and the country's ties to Western Europe will probably remain strong.

If, on the other hand, the Turks conclude that their basic military needs cannot be met by their European allies, they are likely to read this as de facto isolation from NATO and will react much more strongly. In these circumstances, Turkey is likely to explore alternative sources of support abroad -- from Arab states, for example -- but will probably not be able to satisfy its needs in this way. The result might be an inward-turning isolation and a reversion to domestic conservatism which could spell trouble for Turkey's economic health and its role in southern Europe.

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